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The Equal Rights Amendment:
The Contribution of Our Generation
Of Americans
HON. WALTER KARABIAN*
THE PINK BLANKET BURDEN
Sex discrimination starts young; and once it starts, it is ever-
present. A young girl is taught to be quiet and submissive, to
restrain herself rather than give vent to the nervous energy that
is natural in all children. She is frequently told not to do some-
thing she sees her brother do because it's "unladylike, and a little
lady would never do a thing like that." She soon learns that "one
of the very worst things [she] can do, in society's eyes, is to express
a desire to be-or to behave as though [she] were-a [boy]'."' At
the same time a young girl begins to realize that almost every-
thing worthwhile doing in life is unladylike and for boys only.
When she reaches school age, her fortunes take a turn for the
* Assemblyman, California Legislature, 1967-1974. Author of the
Equal Rights Amendment in California. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the skillful assistance of John J. Giovannone of Hastings College
of Law.
1. Johnston and Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judi-
cial Perspective, Jan. 6 N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 675, -744 (1971) (hereinafter cited
as Johnston and Knapp).
worse. In elementary school a girl is taught to conform to a sexual
stereotype of "inferiority, docility, and submissiveness. 2  More-
over, she is taught that this "inferior status [is] . . . the natural
order of things."8 Striking examples of this early encounter with
institutionalized sex discrimination are school textbooks and read-
ers. These books invariably portray men in numerous and diversi-
fied occupations, most of which are exciting and therefore attrac-
tive to school age children; whereas they typically picture women
in a handfull of dull, demeaning jobs. 4 The effect is obvious.
"[T] extbooks and readers. . . convey restricted and damaging pic-
tures of women, encourage girls to undervalue themselves, lower
their aspirations, and deny their potential for achievement."5  Al-
though California has recently passed legislation to eliminate this
textual bias, the effectiveness of this legislation has yet to be
thown.6
Educational sex discrimination continues in high school, where
boys are frequently directed through one curriculum, girls through
another. "Girls are tracked into commercial courses to become the
future secretaries and -typists of the nation, while boys are chan-
neled into college preparatory curricula to become the future man-
agers and professionals." 7 Women are truly taught a subservient
sex role.
As if she were not hindered enough by her disabling high school
experience, a woman may face stiffer entrance requirements when
she attempts to gain admission to a college or university than a
similarly situated male applicant." In the fall of 1968, 41% of all
women entering four-year public colleges had high school grades
of B- or better, while only 18% of all men entering such schools
had attained that level of scholastic achievement. 9 In the fall of
1970 over 40% of all men between the ages of 18 and 21, and over
20% of those 23 to 24 years old, were enrolled in a college or uni-
versity; on the other hand, the percentages of women in these
2. Teaching Woman Her Place: The Role of Public Education in the
Development of Sex Roles, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1196 (1974).
3. Id., at 1215.
4. Id., at 1201.
5. Id., at 1202.
6. Id., at 1222; CAL. EDUC. CODE, § 9240 (West Supp. 1974).
7. The Constitution: Equal Rights and Women, IssuEs 71-72 at 10, (S.
Wise ed. Aug., 1971) (hereinafter cited as ISSUES).
8. CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, THE PRO-
POSED EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, A
MEMORANDUM, at 3 (1970) (hereinafter cited as CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUN-
CIL).
9. 116 CONG. REc. 35452 (1970) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
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age groups enrolled in such institutions were but 29% and 9% re-
spectively.10 Yet women, with a smaller college enrollment than
men, attain significantly more bachelor of arts degrees!',
Graduate school statistics are even more revealing. Women ac-
count for only 37% of all masters degrees, 13% of all doctorates,
and but 4% of all professional degrees.1 2 Nor does this male dom-
ination of higher education 'appear to be yielding to present day
pressures from the movement for women's rights. Women received
fewer Ph.D.'s in 1971 than they did in 1930.'3
Several factors undoubtedly combine to produce this relative
scarcity of women in higher education. Aside from societal brain-
washing which discourages women from engaging in such pursuits,
there are the unwilling parents who hesitate to pay for a daugh-
ter's education which "she'll never use anyway once she's married,"
the almost impossible task of finding a husband willing to work
to support his wife while she seeks her degree (although many
men seem to have little trouble finding wives willing to support
them on a similar quest), and the great difficulty women encoun-
ter obtaining loans and scholarships. But perhaps the most signifi-
cant deterrent is the job market that women face when they com-
plete their educations.
When a young woman graduates from college and starts looking
for a job, she is likely to have a frustrating and even demeaning
experience ahead of her. If she walks into an office for an inter-
view, the first question she will be asked is, "Do you type?"' 4
Women in our society are concentrated in low-level, low-paying
jobs.15 They rarely occupy managerial positions. Despite com-
prising 40% of the white collar work force, women occupy less
10. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN, S.
REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972).
11. Id., at 5.
12. Id., at 5.
13. Brown and Seitz, "You've Come a Long Way, Baby": Historical
Perspectives, SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 3, 20 (R. Morgan ed. 1970).
14. Hearings on the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S.
Const. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendment of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Jan. 1971 CONG. DIG. 16, 20
(hereinafter cited as Hearings) (testimony by Rep. Chisholm, May 5,
1970).
15. EEOC, Toward Job Equality, 2 (1971) (hereinafter cited as EEOC),
117 CONG. REc. 22736 (1971) (remarks by Senator Bayh).
than 10% of all managerial and 14% of all professional positions.1 6
The median income for women is less than three-fifths that for
men, and the gap is widening.17 It is no secret that women with
college degrees make little more than men with 8th grade educa-
tions!' 8  The unemployment rate for women is virtually 50%
higher than it is for men.'9
Vivid evidence of sex discrimination in employment practices can
be found in our public elementary and secondary school systems.
Despite the fact that women comprise 75% of all the teachers in
such schools, they account for only 22% of the elementary school
principals and only 4% of the high school principals. Nor does
this discrimination vanish at higher levels. While 50% of all men
who teach in colleges and universities go on to become full pro-
fessors, only 10% of women instructors gain such tenure.20
Job discrimination against women grows out of the myth that
"woman's only important function, for which she is naturally
made, is ... that of wife and mother."2' This same myth produces
the groundless beliefs that women work merely to supplement
their husbands' incomes, that most women hold jobs only until
they can find a husband and then quit, etc., etc.
These are incredible misconceptions. Contrary to popular opin-
ion, most women work to survive, not for mere supplemental in-
come. These are women without husbands, but often with chil-
dren, and women with husbands making a poor wage.2 2 The sta-
tistics are startling. Over 40% of all women work,23 comprising
16. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN,
supra note 10, at 5; Hearings, supra note 15, at 20 (testimony by Rep.
Chisholm, May 5, 1970).
17. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN, SU-
pra note 10, at 5. See also 117 CONG. REC. 22-36 (1971) (remarks of Sen-
ator Bayh): In 1969 51% of all working women, but only 16% of all work-
ing men, made less than $5,000 per year, while 35% of all working men,
but only 5% of all working women, made more than $10,000 per year.
And also Phillips, Women in Employment, 78 CASE & COM. 8 (No. 4, July-
Aug. 1973): ". . . the median income of full-time working women is less
than $500 per month." (hereinafter cited as Phillips).
18. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN,
supra note 10, at 5; Phillips, supra note 17, at 8.
19. EEOC, supra note 15, at 1; 117 CONG. REC. 22736 (1971) (remarks
of Senator Bayh).
20. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN, supra
note 10, at 5; Teaching Woman Her Place, supra note 2, at 1199.
21. Joreen, The 51 Percent Minority Group: A Statistical Essay, SIs-
TERHOOD IS POWERFUL 37, 45 (R. Morgan ed. 1970).
22. Sacks, Social Bases for Sexual Equality: A Comparative View, Sis-
TERHOOD IS POWERFUL 455, 462-463 (R. Morgan ed. 1970).
23. Ginsberg, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 59 A.B.A.J.
1013, 1016 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Ginsberg).
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nearly 40% of the total work force.24 Nearly half of these women
workers are self-supporting. 25 Almost one out of every four
women in the labor force of this nation is raising one or more
children on her own!26 Of these women workers who are married,
more than 60% have husbands who earn less than $7,000 a year,
so that the family standard of living is dependent on the income
of the working wife as well as that of the husband.27 It cannot
be said that these women work solely for supplemental income;
they work out of necessity.
Other popular beliefs concerning women workers turn out to be
equally erroneous. Two examples adequately demonstrate this.
The first is the notion that women work only until they can find
a husband and that therefore they rarely remain on any job long
enough to make it worthwhile for their employer to train them
or to place them in positions of responsibility. This is clearly un-
true. Over 60% of all women workers are over 35 years of age,28
and over 50% are already married.29 Moreover, the turnover rate
of women employees is virtually identical to that of men. 0 The
second fallacy is the belief that due to childbirth and family re-
sponsibilities, women are absent from their jobs much more often
than men. The fact is that men have a greater absenteeism rate
than women even if the comparison includes days lost due to preg-
nancy!sl
The result of these misconceptions is sex discrimination in em-
ployment; and the consequences of this type of sex discrimination
in the business world are clear. If a woman is to succeed, she
24. Id., at 1016; EEOC, supra note 15, at 1.
25. 117 CONG. REC. 22736 (1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh); Walker,
Sex Discrimination in Government Benefit Programs, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 277,
281 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Walker).
26. Walker, supra note 25, at 281. It is startling to note that 45% of all
minority families headed by women live below the poverty line while only
16% of all minority families headed by men so live. 117 CONG. REc. 22736(1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
27. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS
Aim RESPONsIBILITIEs, A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE, at 11 (1970) (herein-
after cited as A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE); Walker, supra note 25, at 28.
28. 117 CONG. REC. 22736 (1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
29. Id., at 22736; Walker, supra note 25, at 281.
30. 117 CONG. REc. 22736 (1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
31. Verbal Karate, SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 557, 560 (R. Morgan ed.
1970); EEOC, supra note 15, at 4.
must be more talented, work harder, and sacrifice much, much
more than a man.
One particular aspect of sex discrimination in employment de-
mands particular attention. This is the area of protective labor
legislation. Such laws were originally passed to protect women
against exploitation in early industrial "sweat shops". However,
the era of the sweat shop has long since passed. Today, protective
labor legislation often has the effect of keeping women "in lower
paying jobs or out of the labor force altogether" by making it more
desirable for an employer to hire men than women. 2 Rather than
eliminating exploitation, protective labor laws foster it by funnel-
ing women into the lowest-paying jobs available, thereby creating
,a new form of exploitation.33  Such laws are obviously archaic;
they ignore both the realities of employment in the 1970's and the
personal abilities of the individuals in the classes they govern.
One type of protective legislation is of special significance. These
are laws which require an employer to impose leaves of absence
for pregnant employees without providing for job security or re-
tention of accrued benefits and seniority.84 These legally imposed
maternity leaves often require a female employee to remain off
the job for months, during which time she receives neither unem-
ployment insurance nor disability payments.3 5  The net result is
that the family is deprived of a major source of income during
precisely -those months it needs that income most. And, as if the
effects of such laws on the family were not severe enough, one
has only to imagine the impact on women without husbands!
Government benefit programs "reflect and perpetuate the same
social and financial inequities between men and women that exist
in employment, echoing attitudes such as: women's place is in the
home, housework is not valid employment, women are merely sec-
ondary workers, and wives are dependent appendages to 'their hus-
bands." 6
Government benefits are often not as high for women and their
32. Brown, Emerson, Falk, and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amend-
ment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J.
871, 923 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Brown); Berman, Women's Place Un-
der California Law, (A.C.L.U. Publication, April, 1973).
33. IssuEs, supra note 7, at 13.
34. Brown, supra note 32, at 929. Such leaves may be required under
CAL. EDUC. CODE, § 13651.3 (West 1959).
35. E.g., CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 2626 (West 1972) deprives
pregnant women of disability insurance until 28 days after delivery. See
also CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE § 2626.2 (West Supp. 1974) which al-
lows disability benefits where complications are involved, (e.g., c-sections).
36. Walker, supra note 25, at 277.
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dependents as they are for men and their dependents.37 But even
more significant is the additional burden the woman and her hus-
band must frequently meet to successfully claim those benefits.
Under current [workmen's compensation] laws a wife or widow
receives a benefit based on her husband's earnings without meeting
any test of dependency. A husband or widower of a woman
worker is entitled to a benefit only if he proves he receives one-
half or more of his support from his wife.38
These laws combine with the disability or death of the wife to
produce a deleterious effect upon the family which depends upon
her for over 40% of its total income. One out of every four
families where the wife works falls in this category.3 9 There are
numerous other situations in which the applicable benefit statute
requires that the husband prove his dependency before receiving
a government benefit or preference without requiring the wife to
present similar proof. There are even statutes which provide bene-
fits to wives, but deny them entirely to women's husbands in an
identical position.40 Under these statutes a working man is secure
in the knowledge that if some tragedy should strike him down,
the government will help provide for his family; there is no such
security for the working woman.
In each of the above instances, sex discrimination in government
benefit programs is based upon the false assumption that women
work merely to supplement their husbands' incomes and not to
support -themselves and their families. 41  Nowhere is this more
clearly demonstrated than in this nation's welfare program. Over
90% of all welfare families are headed by women,42 and the present
welfare system does very little to provide these families with a
37. E.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 31620, 21622 (West 1968), 31676.1, 31676.11(West Supp. 1974). See also Gruenwald v. Gardner, 590 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968), which held that such different
treatment of men and women in computing social security benefits was
not in conflict with the Constitution.
38. A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 11. See also CAL.
LABOR CODE §§ 3501, 3502 (West 1971).
39. A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 11.
40. Statutes demanding husband prove dependency include: CAL. GOVT.
CODE, §§ 9359.1, 13970, 18973, 21382 (West Supp. 1974), 18974, 2604 (West
1963), 31842 (West 1968); CAL. LABOR CODE, §§ 3501-2 (West 1971). Statutes
which deny benefit to men entirely include CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 21366, 50879,
50811 (West 1966).
41. See p. 5 supra.
42. Phillips, supra note 17, at 8.
viable alternative to welfare. If a woman who single-handedly
heads a family goes to work, she faces lower-paying jobs than her
male counterpart 4 and still incurs the expense of hiring someone
else to care for her children. There is also a good chance that
she will be unable to find any job at all.4 4 In the end her family
winds up with less usable income than if the woman had remained
at home on welfare. And yet there seem to be several obvious
and straightforward ways to ease the plight of the fatherless fam-
ily in a manner that is beneficial both to society and to the woman:
make it possible for her to work. How? With government funded
childcare centers, with tax relief for women (and men) who are
forced to hire babysitters, 45 and with federally funded training pro-
grams aimed at providing women as well as men with gainful em-
ployment. These measures appear so simple that it seems patently
absurd they were not wholeheartedly invoked ten years ago.
But sex discrimination does not confine itself to the lower classes
and to working women; a "typical, middle-class wife" who does
in fact work solely to supplement her husband's income also feels
its heavy-handed effects. Under traditional community property
law, the husband and wife create a community when they marry,
a community in which they are supposed to have an equal interest;
however, the community is that of the husband, and the wife is
a part of it.46 Under California probate law a widow is required
to probate her decedent husband's share of the community prop-
erty whether he dies testate or intestate, but a widower retains
control of his wife's share of the community property unless an
adverse claim to that share arises under the wife's will.47 And if
a married woman wishes to enter into business for herself inde-
pendent of her husband, she must seek a court decree!48
Finally, what happens if a woman commits a crime? Regard-
less of age, she will probably receive a stiffer sentence than her
male counterpart.49 If she is a juvenile, she may not even need
43. See pp. 4-5 supra.
44. See supra note 19. And yet, despite the fact that women constitute
50% of the unemployment labor force, they comprise less than % of the
trainees in federally funded training programs. 117 CONG. REc. 22736
(1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
45. A MATTER OF SIMPLE JusTIcE, supra note 27, at 13, 15.
46. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5135, 5125, 5127 (West 1970).
47. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 202-3 (West 1956). (Ed. note: S.B. 570, CAL.
STATS. 1974, c. 11, effective Jan. 1, 1975, provides that community property
will be treated equally when either spouse dies.)
48. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. §§ 1811-17, 1819-21 (West 1972) (The "Sole
Trader" Statutes).
49. ISSUES, supra note 7, at 10; Johnston and Knapp, supra note 1, at
726.
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to commit a crime at all; she is five times as likely to be before
the juvenile court for a non-criminal matter as a male juvenile. 50
And once within the correctional system of the state, women will
rarely be given useful vocational training; they will be taught do-
mestic science, dressmaking, gardening and the like.51
It is perhaps a significant comment on sex discrimination in our
society that when a woman is born, the chances are she does
not even know the name she will have most of her life.52 At mar-
riage she takes her husband's name automatically. If she wishes
to retain her maiden name, she must go through court proceedings
to change her name back to the one she was born with.53 It is
little wonder that the rights that are of greatest value in our
society, the rights to a job, to a pension, to social security, to all
the fringe benefits of any job, to an education, and the right to
control your own future, "are either flatly denied to women or
are different for women than for men."54
STATUTORY ADVANCES
Legislatures have continually held the historical belief that a
woman's place is in the home, and the laws passed by such legisla-
tures have faithfully reflected this view., 5 Prejudice created the
law; the law, then, in turn, nurtured the prejudice. A self-sustain-
ing cycle was created. However, there appears to be a developing
trend, especially in California, toward greater recognition of
women's rights.
On the federal level there are three major statutory provisions
which operate to eliminate sex discrimination in education and em-
ployment. First, the Equal Pay Act of 196356 requires each individ-
ual, regardless of sex, be paid wages identical to those paid all
similarly situated employees performing the same tasks. Second,
50. ISSUES, supra note 7, at 11.
51. E.g., CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE, § 1123 (West 1972).
52. Ann, The Secretarial Proletariat, SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 86, 94 (R.
Morgan ed. 1970).
53. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. §§ 1275-79 (West 1955), as amended (West
Supp. 1971). See also CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 310(b), 321, 450 (West Supp.
1974), which requires women voters to register and vote as Miss or Mrs.
"but never Ms."
54. Hearings, supra note 14, at 18 (testimony by Rep. Griffiths, May
5, 1970).
55. Johnston and Knapp, supra note 1, at 737.
56. The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 denies federal assis-
tance to educational institutions which engage in sex discrimina-
tion.57 However, neither of these laws accomplish what it purports
to. The Equal Pay Act can be circumvented with relative ease.
Title IX contains enormous exceptions which include admission to
all private schools and to those schools which are traditionally of
one sex.58  Title IX is also weakened by its lack of an effective
enforcement mechanism. 59
The third federal statutory measure designed to attack sex dis-
crimination, and undoubtedly the most important, is Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.60 As originally enacted,61 Title VII
prohibits sex discrimination in employment practices by employers,
unions, and employment agencies that fall within the broad scope
of the Act. 2 However, Title VII was hindered by the weak en-
forcement procedures it originally contained. 63 This weakness was
remedied when the Act was amended in 1972.64 At the same time,
the Act was expanded to include state and local governments. 65
While the purpose and nature of this article preclude an extensive
examination of Title VII in its entirety,6 there is one provision
of the Act which demands closer attention.
Title VII permits what was at first considered a gaping excep-
tion: Sex discrimination is permitted where sex is shown to be
a "bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) 1.67 However, the
guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission (EEOC) have narrowly defined this exception. Under
these guidelines, which the courts have apparently accepted as
their own,68 a BFOQ exception will be recognized only in instances
57. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (1974).
58. Id., § 1681 (a) (1) and (5); Ginsberg, supra note 23, at 1014.
59. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (1974); Ginsberg, supra note 23,.at 1014.
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(l)-(15) (1974, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1)-(15)).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1)-(15) (1967).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5) (1964).
64. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(5) (1974).
65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (1974) deleted the exception for a "state or
political subdivision thereof" found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1964).
66. For a more intensive discussion of Title VII, see EEOC supra note
15; Oldham, Questions of Exclusion and Exception Under Title VII-
"Sex Plus" and the BFOQ, 23 HASTINGs L.J. 55 (1971) (hereinafter cited
as Oldham); Wilcox, The Sex Discrimination Provisions of Title VII: A
Maturing Controversy, 3 PACIFIC L.J. 37 (1972).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2) (e) (1964).
68. E.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d
228 (5th Cir. 1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th
Cir. 1971); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 13-14, 485 P.2d 529, 537,
95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339 (1971).
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where a job requires a particular sex for the purposes of authen-
ticity or genuineness.6 9 The overall effect, then, of Title VII is
to require that each individual employee be judged by his or her
own personal characteristics and capabilities rather than by a sex-
ual stereotype in all but a very few situations.
On the state level California has its own versions of the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII.70  In fact, article XX, section 18 of the
California State Constitution provides that a person may not be
disqualified because of sex from entering or pursuing a lawful
business, vocation, or profession.7 1 However, California has struck
a much more significant blow for women's rights with its sweep-
ing revisions of the state community property laws.72 An exam-
ination of these new laws is heartening.
Under the old California community property law system, when
they married, husband and wife created a community in which
each supposedly had an equal interest.73 But this equality of in-
terest was hardly a reality. The husband had the exclusive power
to manage and control the community which he and his wife
"shared".74 With few exceptions,7 5 he had the ability to do with
the community property as he chose: to sell, buy, rent, exchange,
invest, or whatever. When the husband chose the family residence,
the wife was obliged to conform ... by law!76
The wife's control over the community property, on the other
hand, was almost nonexistent. The wife's separate earnings were
hers to do with as she wished, provided she didn't make a gift
of them to anyone or dispose of them without adequate considera-
tion.7 7 However, she retained this limited power over her own
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (1971). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1973); and
Oldham, supra note 66, at 81, 84.
70. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1197.5 (West 1971), 1420 (West Supp. 1974).
71. CAL. CONST. Art. XX, § 18.
72. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5102, 5195, 5110, 5115.5, 5116, 5117, 5120, 5121, 5122,
5123, 5125, 5127, 5131, 5132, as amended (Deering's Cal. Codes, Advanced
Legislative Service (hereinafter cited as Deering's Adv.), ch. 987, p. 1677
(1973)); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5101, 5124 repealed (Deering's Adv., ch. 987, p.
1677, 1973); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1812.30-.31 (West Supp. 1974); CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 5116, as amended (Deering's Adv., ch. 994, p. 1825, 1973).
73. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5195 (West 1970).
74. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5195, 5125, 5127 (West 1970).
75. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5113.5, 5124, 5125, 5127, 5128 (West 1970).
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5101 (West 1970).
77. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5124 (West 1970).
earnings only so long as she kept them separate from the property
of the community. Once her earnings became commingled, they
became community property ... i.e., the husband's property7
8
But the most debilitating of all the old community property stat-
utes was that which provided that the community property was
not liable for the contracts of the wife made after marriage unless
the husband gave his written pledge that the community backed
the wife's promise.79 The net effect of this statute was to make
it virtually impossible for a married woman to obtain credit. Unless
she carefully maintained her own earnings and property apart
from that of her husband and the community, the wife had nothing
of her own to provide as security for her contractual obligations.
No reasonable business could be expected to extend credit to a
woman under such circumstances.
The new California community property law system, which takes
full effect January 1, 1975, eliminates these blatant inequalities.
It extends to the wife the same powers of management and control
over the community property that previously rested solely with
the husband.8 0 It removes from the wife the legal obligation to
conform her residence to that of her husband.8 1 Furthermore, it
extends to each married woman the ability to deal with her own
separate earnings equal to that of her husband's ability with re-
spect to his own earnings.8 2
But most importantly, the new system makes the community li-
able for the post-marital contracts of the wife as well as for those
of the husband.8 3 The purpose of this legislation is clear. It is
an attempt to enable women to obtain credit under the same cir-
cumstances as men. This intent is doubly emphasized by addi-
tional statutory provisions which make it unlawful to deny credit
to a woman whenever credit would not be denied to a man under
similar circumstances.8 4
California's new community property system is not a guarantee
of total sexual equality. But it is a start; hopefully one which
will be followed vigorously.
78. Id.
79. CAL. CI. CODE § 5116 (West 1970).
80. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5195, 5125, 5127 as amended, (Deering's Adv., ch.
987, p. 1677, 1973).
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5101 repealed (Deering's Adv., ch. 987, p. 1677,
1973).
82. CAL. CiM. CODE § 5124 repealed (Deering's Adv., ch. 987, p. 1677,
1973).
83. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5116, as amended (Deering's Adv., ch. 987, p. 1677,
and ch. 999, p. 1825, 1973).
84. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1812.30-.31 (West Supp. 1974).
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THE EMERGENCE OF WOMEN AS PERSONS IN THE
EYES OF THE COURTS
Throughout most of the past two centuries, courts have followed
the lead of the legislatures, adopted the same erroneous assump-
tions, and accordingly failed to recognize the basic rights of
women.8 5
Historically, the subordinate status of women has been firmly
entrenched in our legal system. At Common Law women were
conceded few rights. Constitutions were drafted on the assump-
tion that women did not exist as legal persons. Courts classified
women with children and imbeciles, denying their capacity to
think and act as responsible adults and enclosing them in the
bonds of protective paternalism.8 6
When called upon to interpret the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments of the United States Constitution,8 7 the courts of this nation
have invariably held true to form in denying women judicial re-
lief from sex discrimination.8 8 However, in the past five years
there has been a trend toward court recognition of women's rights.
While these decisions can hardly be said to constitute a wave of
enlightenment, they do represent encouraging breakthroughs.
In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.89 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals followed EEOC guidelines in adopt-
ing a narrow interpretation" of the BFOQ exception to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.91 In so doing, the court found
that a job which required women to lift in excess of 30 pounds
in violation of state law did not constitute a job within the BFOQ
exception . 2 Therefore, an employer could not disregard individual
capabilities of female applicants and reject women solely on the
basis of sexual stereotypes.
... Title VII rejects . .. romantic paternalism . .. and instead
vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not
to take on unromantic tasks. Men have always had the right to
85. See p. 12 supra. See also Ginsberg, supra note 23, at 1015.
86. Brown, supra note 32, at 872.
87. CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 5.
88. E.g., Bradwell v. Star, 83 U.S. (Wall.) 130 (1873); Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Hoyt v. Flor-
ida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
89. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1964).
90. Id., at 232-5. See also p. 14 supra and supra note 69.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (1964).
92. 408 F.2d 228, 234-5 (5th Cir. 1969).
determine whether the incremental increase in remuneration for
strenuous, dangerous, boring or unromantic tasks is worth the
candle. The promise of Title VII is that women are now to be
on an equal footing.93
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar result in
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co. 4 There the court found that
women could not be excluded under the BFOQ exception from
"arduous" jobs which would force women to work excessive hours
and lift weights in excess of 50 pounds, both in violation of Califor-
nia state labor laws."" The court stressed that each employee must
be judged on his or her individual abilities.96 But more impor-
tantly, the court expressly held that state protective legislation,
based on stereotyped characteristics generally attributed to one
sex, which prohibits employers from hiring women to perform
tasks in violation of such legislation does not constitute a bona fide
occupational qualification.97
As promising as the Weeks and Rosenfeld decisions were, they
did not deal with sex discrimination on a constitutional level. That
task was left to the California Supreme Court in the landmark
decision Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby.98
In Sail'er Inn several employers hired women bartenders in
violation of a California statute which prohibited women from
tending bar except in certain narrow situations.99 These employ-
ers sought a mandate to prevent the Department of Alcoholic Bev-
erage Control from revoking their liquor licenses. The California
Supreme Court found that the statute was in conflict with article
XX, section 18 of the state constitution which prohibits the dis-
qualification of any person "because of sex, from entering or pur-
suing" any lawful profession.100 The state statute was therefore
invalid. The court also found that the statute was in conflict with
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,1 1 and that it must therefore
93. Id., at 256.
94. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
95. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1350, 1350.5 (West 1971) prohibit an employer
from working female employees more than 48 hours per week or more
than eight hours in any twenty-four hour period; CAL. LABOR CODE § 1251
(West 1971), prohibits an employer from requiring or permitting a female
employee from lifting any object weighing fifty pounds or more. It is
significant to note that, as a result of the Rosenfeld opinion, the California
State Welfare Commission no longer enforces those laws.
96. 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
97. Id., at 1221.
98. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
99. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25656 (West Supp. 1971), repealed (West
Supp. 1974).
100. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 9-10, 485 P.2d 529, 533-4, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 333-4 (1971).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(15) (1970).
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yield to the federal law under the supremacy doctrine.10 2 In so
finding, the California court followed EEOC guidelines in narrowly
interpreting the BFOQ exception to Title VII and in denying a
claim for such an exception. 1
03
But the California court did not stop there and proceeded to
tackle the equal protection arguments advanced by the petitioners
head on. The court first examined the standards traditionally ap-
plied to test classifications under the Equal Protection Clause of
the fourteenth amendment.104 The court explained that classifica-
tions are subject to strict judicial scrutiny where members of a
class are being denied a fundamental right or where the classifica-
tion itself is suspect. 10 5 The court then proceeded to hold that
the right 'to work was a fundamental right.
The right to work and the concomitant opportunity to achieve eco-
nomic security and stability are essential to the pursuit of life,
liberty and happiness ... Limitations on this right may be sus-
tained only after the most careful scrutiny.106
Having found that the statute denied a fundamental right to the
members of the class it governed, the California Supreme Court
had no need to go any further before applying the strict scrutiny
standard. Nevertheless, the court did go on and became "the first
state court of last resort to hold that sex is a suspect classi-
fication."'01 7 The language of -the court stresses that the individual
must be judged by personal capabilities and characteristics, not by
sexual stereotypes.
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status into
which the class members are locked by the accident of birth.
What differentiates sex from nonsuspect statuses, such as intelli-
gence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized sus-
pect classifications is that the characteristic frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. (Citation
omitted.) The result is that the whole class is relegated to an
inferior legal status without regard to the capabilities or charac-
teristics of its individual members.'0 8
102. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 10-15, 485 P.2d 529, 534-8, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 334-8
(1971).
103. Id., at 13-14, 485 P.2d at 537, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
105. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 16, 485 P.2d 529, 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339 (1971).
106. Id., at 17, 485 P.2d at 539, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
107. Id., at 20, 485 P.2d at 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 341; Johnston and Knapp,
supra note 1, at 690.
108. 5 Cal, 3d 1, 18, 485 P.2d 529, 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340 (1971).
Having found the right to work a fundamental right and sex
a suspect classification, the court applied the strict scrutiny stand-
ard to the California statute and found it in conflict with the Equal
Protection Clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution and article I, sections 11 and 21 of the Califor-
nia Constitution. 10 9 Since the state failed to establish a compelling
state interest which required the continued existence of the state
statute in the face of this conflict," 0 the statute was unconstitu-
tional and therefore invalid."'
Sail'er Inn is a remarkable opinion. Perhaps the most re-
markable aspect of the opinion is the simplicity and clarity of its
reasoning. But a landmark court decision is only as significant
as its effects. To be sure, Sail'er Inn serves notice on the California
legislature that, in the future, sex classifications will be subjected
to intense judicial examination before being allowed to stand. But
more importantly, SaWer Inn serves as a challenge to the Supreme
Court of the United States to re-examine its own position on the
validity of sex classifications. 1 2
In Reed v. Reed"' the Supreme Court was given an opportunity
to answer that challenge when the Court was called upon to review
an Idaho statute" 4 which provided that as between persons equally
qualified to administer estates males must be preferred to females.
The Court held that this statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment." 5
The Equal Protection Clause . .. [denies] to States the power
to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed
by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification "must
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall
be treated alike." Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920). 1 1 6
The Court found that the purpose of the statute was judicial ex-
pediency and held that sex discrimination for such a purpose was
the "very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment .... ,,17
109. Id., at 22, 485 P.2d at 543, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
110. Id., at 20-22, 485 P.2d at 541-3, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 341-3.
111. Id., at 22, 485 P.2d at 543, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
112. Johnston and Knapp, supra note 1, at 690.
113. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
114. IDAHO CODE §§ 15-312, 15-314, repealed (1972).
115. 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971).
116. Id., at 75-6.
117. Id., at 76.
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The test espoused by the Supreme Court in Reed was one of
reasonableness. The Court made it clear that a purely arbitrary
statutory provision would not be tolerated. However, at the same
time the Court also seemed to imply that if the state could dem-
onstrate a legitimate or reasonable purpose for the discrimination,
and apparently expediency is not such a reasonable purpose, the
statute would be maintained. Therefore, while the Reed decision
opened a door through which statutory sex discrimination could
be challenged, it placed the burden of that challenge heavily upon
the shoulders of women, the victims of the discrimination.
Nonetheless, under the influence of Reed and Sait'er Inn several
state practices fostering sex discrimination have been declared un-
constitutional. An example of this is La Fleur v. Cleveland Board
of Education."8 There the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was
faced with a local school board rule imposing involuntary unpaid
maternity leaves of absence five months prior to and at least three
months after delivery. The state interest asserted to support this
rule was "continuity of classroom instruction and relief of burden-
some administrative problems."" 9 Citing both Reed v. Reed and
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby the court held that the school board rule
was an "arbitrary and unreasonable" way to accomplish the state
purpose because it singled out women and pregnancy without
touching other types of illnesses and disabilities. The statute was
therefore unreasonable and in conflict with the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 20
A statutory sex classification came up before the United States
Supreme Court again in Frontiero v. Richardson.121 In that case
a female military officer challenged two federal statutes which per-
mitted "a serviceman to claim his wife as a 'dependent' without
regard to whether-she is in fact dependent upon him for any part
of her support", while requiring a service-woman to prove her hus-
band "is in fact dependent upon her for over half of his support"
before claiming him as a dependent for benefit purposes.122 Eight
Justices agreed that the statutes, in so far as they provided for
118. 465 F.2d 1185 (6th Cir. 1972).
119. Id., at 1187.
120. Id., at 1188. See also Brendon v. Independent School District, 342
F. Supp. 1224 (1972).
121. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
122. 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970); 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2) (1970).
different treatment for women than for men, were in conflict with
the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment of the federal Con-
stitution and were therefore unenforceable 'as to those provisions
which discriminated on the basis of sex. Only Justice Rehnquist
dissented.12
While there was no majority opinion in the decision, Justices
Douglas, White, and Marshall did join in Mr. Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion. That opinion, which echoes the reasoning of the
California Supreme Court in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 24 held that
... classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon
race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must
therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.12 5
In so holding, Justice Brennan described Reed v. Reed126 as a "de-
parture from 'traditional' rational basis analysis with respect to sex-
based classifications" which the Court was extending only slightly
by labelling sex a suspect classification in the case at hand. 27
Justice Brennan also found support for his opinion in the recent
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment by Congress.128
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in a one sentence opinion citing
Reed.1 29
Justices Powell, Burger, and Blackmun joined in a separate con-
curring opinion which emphasized three major points. First, since
the statutes under examination provided for sex discrimination
merely to achieve administrative convenience, the Reed decision
was sufficient precedent to support a finding that the classification
was unreasonable and in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the fifth amendment. Second, it was therefore unnecessary to
"characterize sex as a suspect classification" for the purposes of
this decision. Third, the Court should refrain from characterizing
sex as a suspect classification at this time because in so doing the
Court would be "pre-empting" a major political decision, the ratifi-
cation of the Equal Rights Amendment, which should be decided
by the various state legislatures, not by the Court. 80
.123. 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973).
124. Pp. 19-22 supra.
125. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
126. Pp. 22-3 supra.
127. 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). See also O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp.
565, 577 (1973) and Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 372, 796-7 (1973) which
describe Reed v. Reed as a middle ground between the rational basis and
the strict scrutiny standards.
128. 411 U.S. 677, 687-8 (1973).
129. Id., at 691.
130. Id., at 691-2.
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The specific effects of Frontiero are unclear. It is certain that
four Supreme Court Justices now consider sex a suspect classifica-
tion. But since three, and probably four, of the other Justices
found it unnecessary to reach such a conclusion to strike down
the challenged statutes, the position of a majority of the Court
is still unknown. However, it appears safe to assume that were
a situation to present itself in which a statute providing for sex
discrimination could be struck down only by finding sex a suspect
classification, one of these four concurring Justices would do so.150a
Several lower courts have accepted this assumption.
In Smith v. City of East Cleveland'31 a federal district court
in Ohio applied Frontiero to city police hiring standards which re-
quired all applicants to be at least five feet eight inches in height
and weigh 150 pounds. Since these standards had the effect of
excluding nearly all women and were not demonstrably related
to job performance, the court found that the city hiring standards
were in conflict with the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 3 2
An even more significant decision was handed down by another
federal district court in Healy v. Edwards.33 There the court was
faced with a Louisiana constitutional provision and its accompany-
ing statute which exempted women from jury service unless they
130a. NOTE: Shortly after this article was submitted for publication,
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Kahn v. Sherin, 94 S. Ct.
1734 (1974), in which a Florida statute giving widows, but not widowers,
a $500 exemption from property taxation was upheld. The majority opin-
ion in that case strongly implied that the Fourteenth Amendment permits
affirmative state action to remedy the effects of past sex discrimination.
However, two things must be pointed out which may diminish the effect
of this decision. First, the statute in question dealt with taxation, an area
in which the states have traditionally had broad discretion in making clas-
sifications. Kahn v. Sherin, 94 S. Ct. 1734, 1737. Second, the Justices who
joined in the majority opinion comprised an unlikely combination: Chief
Justice Burger, Justices Douglas, Stewart, Powell, Blackmun and Rehn-
quist. Justices Brennan, Marshall and White dissented, asserting positions
that may be more reconcilable with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973), than that in the majority opinion. Undoubtedly, Mr. Justice Doug-
las would have joined the ranks of the dissenters had the state statute
discriminated against women rather than for them. Whether any of the
opinioning Justices in the majority opinion would have made a similar
shift in position is unclear.
131. 363 F. Supp. 1131 (1973).
132. Id., at 1144.
133. 563 F. Supp. 1110 (1973).
filed a written declaration of their desire to serve. 34 After hold-
ing that all litigants, especially female litigants, had sufficient
standing to challenge the provisions,13 5 the court examined the
United States Supreme Court decision in Hoyt v. Florida,3 6 which
had upheld the constitutionality of an almost identical Florida stat-
ute13 7 in 1961. The court concluded that the Reed and Frontiero
decisions had destroyed the basis for the Supreme Court's holding
in Hoyt and that the district court would therefore be justified
in refusing to follow the Hoyt opinion. 38  Guided by Reed and
Frontiero the court then found that since women were just as qual-
ified to serve as jurors as men were, the Louisiana statute violated
the fourteenth amendment Equal Protection rights of all female
litigants.13 9 The court also found that since the statute produced
juries 'almost exclusively male, such juries were not "truly repre-
sentative of the community," and litigants, both male and female,
were thereby denied Due Process of Law, also in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. 40
Similar reasoning can be found in Bowen v. Hackett'4 ' and Bal-
lard v. Laird.'42 In Bowen a federal district court struck down
as violative of the Equal Protection Clause those portions of Rhode
Island's unemployment compensation and temporary disability in-
surance laws which required women to prove the total dependency
of children for whom they claimed dependency allowance incre-
ments, without requiring similar proof from men. 143 In so hold-
ing, the court observed that the argument that the statute "recog-
nized that in most cases the main support of minor children is
the father, is but another phrasing of the argument of administra-
tive convenience" which was rejected in Reed and Frontiero.44 In
like fashion, another district court in Ballard v. Laird held 'that
a federal statutory scheme 45 which gave female naval officers
preferential treatment by guaranteeing them 13 years of active com-
missioned service without granting male officers an equivalent
guarantee was in conflict with the Due Process Clause of the fifth
134. LA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 41; LA. CODE Or Camf. PR~c. art. 402; L.S.A.-
R.S. 13:3055.
135. 363 F. Supp. 1110, 1112-3 (1973).
136. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
137. FLA. STAT., § 40.01(1) (1959).
138. 363 F. Supp. 1110, 1117 (1973).
139. Id., at 1113-4.
140. Id., at 1115-6.
141. 361 F. Supp. 854 (1973).
142. 360 F. Supp. 643 (1973).
143. GEN. LAWS R.I. §§ 28-41-5 (c), 28-44-6(c), 33-15-1 (1956).
144. 361 F. Supp. 854, 861 (1973).
145, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 6382, 6401.
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amendment. The court followed Reed and Frontiero in holding
that the statutory scheme constituted an "invidious discriminatory
practice" which could not survive judicial scrutiny because there
did not exist a sufficient government interest to support it. Fiscal
expense was not such a compelling government interest as "to jus-
tify infringement of due process. '"140
Finally, in Aiello v. Hansen147 a federal district court in Califor-
nia invalidated a state unemployment insurance statute148 which
exempted pregnancy-related work loss from the coverage of the
state disability insurance program until 2B days after the termina-
tion of the pregnancy. The court felt that it was unnecessary to
determine whether sex discrimination was suspect, but found that
the statute was invalid under the standards developed in the Reed
decision. 49 The logic of the decision is illuminating. The court
first determined that the purpose of disability insurance is to com-
pensate for wages lost by disabled and therefore unemployed in-
dividuals.150 The court then found that pregnancy-related disabil-
ity creates economic hardship identical to that suffered by workers
suffering from other disabilities, thereby implying that the classifi-
cation was arbitrary because it had no basis for differentiation.'5'
Finally the court held that the state interest in preserving the "fis-
cal integrity" of the program could not be accomplished by dis-
criminating against pregnancy-related disabilities because such dis-
crimination does not have a "fair ,and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation.' 15 2 If the state wished to preserve the
program fiscally, it would have to place a ceiling on all claims
or employ some other cost-saving method which would not arbi-
trarily exclude a certain type of disability. 5 3 The statute as it
stood was unconstitutional. 153a
146. 360 F. Supp. 643, 646-8 (1973).
147. 359 F. Supp. 792 (1973).
148. CAL. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. CODE, § 2626 (West 1972), as amended,
§ 2626, 2626.2 (West Supp. 1974).
149. 359 F. Supp. 792, 796-7 (1973).
150. Id., at 797.
151. Id.
152. Id., at 798.
153. Id., at 799.
153a. NOTE: After this article was submitted for publication, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision. The
Court did not find the statute to be in violation of the right to equal protec-
tion. According to the majority, per Mr. Justice Stewart, "The state is
As the above cases demonstrate, judicial relief from sex discrimi-
nation can indeed be obtained under the present federal and state
laws and constitutions. But court decisions which depend upon
broad interpretations of vague constitutional and statutory lan-
guage are limited by the judges who hand them down; and judges
must reflect their own social and cultural upbringing. They are
festrained by the "strictures of their own conditioning".154 Each
time a court decision is won by an advocate for equal rights, a
prior battle must already have been won in the minds of the judges
rendering -that decision. When that prior battle is lost or not
fought at all, the attempt to gain court recognition of women's
rights is doomed to failure. Only a definitive denunciation of sex
discrimination which demands a uniform judicial approach can re-
move this heavy burden from those who seek their equal rights
under the Constitution.
THE WHY AND WHEREFORE OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AmENDMENT
In 1848 in Seneca Falls, New York, this nation's movement for
women's rights was begun by several hundred men and women
with the Seneca Falls Declaration of Rights and Sentiments. 5
Nonetheless, today, more than 125 years later, sex discrimination
is still very much alive and flourishing in this country. While
not required by the Equal Protection Clause (of the Constitution) to sacri-
fice the self-supporting nature of the program, reduce the benefits payable
for covered disabilities, or increase the maximum employee contribution
rate just to provide protection against another risk of disability such as
normal pregnancy." Apparently the majority did feel that concern for the
"fiscal integrity" of the program outweighed whatever possible denial of
equal protection existed in the coverage. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Brennan
noted that since the plan covered disabilities suffered mostly by men but
failed to cover disabilities related to normal pregnancy, it did create "a
double standard for disability compensation." See 87 The Los Angeles
Daily Journal 121, at 1 (June 18, 1974).
154. Johnston and Knapp, supra note 1, at 741-7.
155. Brown and Seitz, "You've Come a Long Way, Baby": Historical
Perspectives, SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 3, 15-16 (R. Morgan ed. 1970). Some
of the more pertinent sections of that declaration are: "The history of
mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of
men toward women, having in direct object the establishment of an abso-
lute tyranny over her."
" . . (Man) has monopolized nearly all profitable employment and from
those she is permitted to follow, she receives but a scanty remuneration.
He closes against her all the avenues to wealth and distinction which he
considers most honorable to himself .
"He has endeavored, in every way he could, to destroy her confidence
in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing
to lead an abject and dependent life."
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it may be possible to gain sexual equality through piecemeal leg-
islation 'and random court decisions, such methods have proven to
be much too haphazard and to require much too much time to
be acceptable. 1 6 It appears that sex discrimination, like race dis-
crimination, can be dealt with effectively only through a broad
and permanent national commitment, a Constitutional amend-
ment.
157
The Equal Rights Amendment is such a commitment. It pro-
vides:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of
sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after
the date of ratification.' s58
Critics of this amendment argue that it is unnecessary, that the
present Constitution is sufficient to eliminate sex discrimination,
or that piecemeal legislation can 'accomplish the task more swiftly
and precisely. These criticisms are unsound. When the Constitu-
tion was adopted in 1789, women were not considered equal to men;'
therefore, the Constitution was not drafted to apply to women. 59
Nor had this attitude changed significantly by the time of the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment. Hence, each time a court
grants Constitutional rights to women, it is extending the words
of the Constitution beyond their original meaning. While the
United States Supreme Court has shown little hesitation to make
such extensions, history serves as a great source of judicial inertia.
Even if the ERA is unnecessary because it merely repeats guaran-
tees found elsewhere in the Constitution, its adoption would do
156. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., EQUAL RiGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN, su-
pra note 10, at 6; Hearings, supra note 15, at 16 (testimony by Rep. Grif-
fiths, May 5, 1970); 116 CONG. REc. 35452 (1970) (remarks of Senator
Bayh).
157. Johnston and Knapp, supra note 1, at 738-741.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII, proposed (March 22, 1972).
159. Hearings, supra note 14, at 22 (testimony by Margaret C. Leonard,
Vice Chairman for the Nat'l Women's Party, May 6, 1970), 2B (testimony
by Jean Witter, Chairman, E.R.A. Comm., Nat'l Organization of Women,
May 5, 1970).
no harm. 160 A truth does not become a falsehood by being spoken
a second time.
As for piecemeal legislation, the delays inherent in that approach
have already been noted.161 The ERA would fulfill the "need for
a single coherent theory of women's equality before the law, and
for a consistent nationwide application of this theory," something
piecemeal legislation cannot do. 62 But more importantly, the
Equal Rights Amendment would serve as a great symbol of this
nation's commitment to ending sex discrimination. 63 Not only
would it provide a much needed impetus to state legislatures, but
it would also encourage individual citizens to re-examine their own
behavior patterns which result in sexual bias. 64 Again, piecemeal
legislation is unable to accomplish such a feat.
Pervasive discrimination against women is deeply entrenched in
the United States. To change this pattern will require a broad
national commitment to the ideal of equality between the sexes
under law. When one examines the historical and legal context
in which sex discrimination has flourished, the need for a constitu-
tional amendment to reverse the process becomes almost self-
evident.165
Even the President's own Task Force on Women's Rights and Re-
sponsibilities has recommended this nation make such a commit-
ment in order to eliminate sex discrimination.'6 6
But what will the Equal Rights Amendment do? What will be
its effects? While it is clear the ERA will have no application
to personal conduct, since the amendment applies only to federal,
state, and local governments, it will define a legal system under
which "each person will be judged on the basis of individual merit"
and not on the basis of sexual stereotypes. 16 7 However, this pro-
duces different results in different situations.
Under the ERA when a court is called upon to judge a statute
which provides for sex discrimination on the basis of sexual ster-
eotypes, it will have two choices: either invalidate the entire stat-
ute or extend the coverage of the statute to both sexes. 6 8  Where
160. ISSUES, supra note 8, at 11.
161. P. 31 supra.
162. Brown, supra note 33, at 883.
163. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., EQUAL RicHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN, SU-
pra note 1, at 6; Hearings, supra note 15, at 18 (testimony by Rep. Grif-
fiths, May 5, 1970).
164. ISSUES, supra note 8, at 11-12.
165. Id., at 10.
166. A MATTER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 20, at III.
167. Ginsberg, supra note 24, at 1019.
168. CITIZENS' ADvIsoRY COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 11; Brown, supra
note 32, at 713.
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the statute "serves only to restrict, deny or limit the freedoms or
rights of one sex," the court will undoubtedly invalidate the entire
statute.169 In fact, the Constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws will require this invalidation in the case of a criminal
statute.170 Therefore laws in this category must be revised by the
legislatures. On the other hand, laws which confer a benefit may
be extended rather than invalidated. In determining whether a
statute should be extended, a court must consider the feasibility
of such an extension, whether it follows or destroys the legislative
intent in enacting the statute originally, and whether the extension
includes a small or a large class within its coverage. 171 Admittedly
there is a reluctance on the part of courts in general to judicially
extend the coverage of a statute, but there is also ample precedent
for such extensions.172
Examples of laws which would be invalidated are: criminal stat-
utes which provide for longer or potentially longer sentences-
whether by statutory mandate or through indeterminate sentenc-
ing procedures-for one sex than for the other; 173 state laws which
prohibit married women from entering into a business independent
of their husbands without court approval; entrance requirements
in state educational institutions which demand higher grades of
women than of men; and government benefit programs which deny
or reduce benefits to individuals solely because of their sex. Ex-
amples of legislation which would probably be extended under the
amendment are: interspousal support requirements; many state
protective labor laws; and community property laws which vest
control in the husband but not in the wife.1 74 Unique examples
of those statutes which will require judicial legislating are those
169. CiTizENs' ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 11; Brown, supra
note 32, at 916.
170. Brown, supra note 32, at 915.
171. Id., at 914-15.
172. E.g., Potlatch Forest v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Arkansas,
W.D. 1970), where premium overtime pay for men was raised to the higher
level required by the statute to be paid to women when the Arkansas
law was challenged under the Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)); Bowe
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), where weight-lifting
restrictions were extended to men; and Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp.
854 (1973), where military service guarantees were extended to men.
173. Brown, supra note 32, at 965-966.
174. Note that California has already taken steps to meet this demand
pp. 14-16 supra.
laws which contain age limitations. Age limitations which restrict
the freedom of one sex longer than that ,of the other will be recon-
structed so that the lower age will 'apply to both sexes. On the
other hand, age limitations which confer a benefit to one sex for
a longer period than to the -other will be reconstructed so that
the higher age will apply.175
Assuredly a great deal of legislative and judicial activity will
be required by the ratification of the ERA; every new Constitu-
tional amendment demands such activity to implement and to clar-
ify its exact meaning. Under the third section of the ERA itself,
legislative revision will be given a two year grace period before
the amendment takes effect. In addition, such revision will be tak-
ing place on a nationwide scale so that state legislatures can look
to each other and .to undoubtedly innumerable law review articles
for guidance and assistance.176
Opponents of the principle for which the Equal Rights Amend-
ment stands raise three major arguments against ratification. First,
men and women would be compelled by the ERA to share the
same toilet and sleeping facilities. This is patently absurd. No
court in this nation would so interpret ,the Equal Rights Amend-
ment. In Griswold v. Connecticut 77 the Supreme Court recog-
nized a general Constitutional right to privacy. Undoubtedly, this
decision would be extended to permit -and also to require separate
facilities for the carrying out of personal functions ... even under
the ERA.178
Second, law pertaining to rape and childbearing will be uncon-
stitutional. This is also an erroneous conclusion. Laws, such as
those forbidding forcible rape or pertaining to childbearing, which
can only apply to one sex, no matter how the legislature phrases
such laws, because they directly concern physical characteristics
found solely in one sex, will remain intact under the ERA. 7 9 It
is only those laws, providing for different treatment of individuals
because of characteristics which are not unique to one sex, which
are merely disguised forms of invidious sex discrimination that the
Equal Rights Amendment will forbid. An example of this latter
type of statute is that provision of the unemployment code of a
175. CITIZENS' ADVISORY CoUNcIL, supra note 8, at 13.
176. Brown, supra note 32, at 910.
177. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
178. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN,
supra note 10 at 7; Ciz=ENs' ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 8 at 14, Brown,
supra note 32, at 900-02.
179.' CIrzENs' ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 13; Brown, supra
note 32, at 894.
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state which allows a woman to claim benefits because she is forced
to refrain from working -in order to raise the family children, but
which denies such benefits to a man in an identical situation.
The third objection raised is that women would become subject
to the draft. And why not??!!! There is no reason why the duty
of defending this country should fall solely on the shoulders of
its male citizens. In this highly technological age, most military
jobs do not require the Spartan physical attributes demanded by
the battlefield. Under the ERA women would not be required to
serve where they are not physically suited to the job any more
than men are required to do so today.180 All the Equal Rights
Amendment demands is that each individual be judged on his or
her own individual capabilities and characteristics.' 8 ' Moreover,
the trade skills learned in the service, which would open up many
new job areas to women in civilian life, and the government bene-
fits which accrue to all service personnel would help eliminate sex
discrimination in our society as a whole.182
The Equal Rights Amendment is not a cure-all, a panacea for
every "invidious" effect of sex discrimination in this nation. Prej-
udices will linger long after it is ratified and its implementing leg-
islation passed. But the ERA will "provide protection for those
who are most abused, and . . . begin the process of evolutionary
change by compelling the insensitive majority to re-examine its
unconscious attitudes.' '18
The amendment will not eradicate, immediately upon passage, all
the unduly discriminatory habits and customs of this country. No
amendment or statute could immediately solve the whole problem
of unfair discrimination based on sex. The bulk of the prejudice
and unfairness against women does not stem from the command
of specific statutes. It comes from socially engrained ideas about
180. CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 11.
181. Of course, military regulations containing unnecessary and arbi-
trary physical requirements, such as one which would require all military
personnel above the rank of lieutenant to be five feet ten inches in height
and weigh at least 170 pounds, which operate to exclude virtually all
women from certain positions in the military because of their sex and
without regard to the demands of the position or the ability of an individ-
ual woman to meet those demands, would be invalid under the ERA.
182. Hale and Karowitz, Women and the Draft: A Response to Critics
of the ERA, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 199 (1971).
183. Hearings, supra note 14, at 20 (testimony by Rep. Chisholm, May
5,1970).
the "proper role of women."
But . . . this amendment will go a long way toward providing
the kind of dignity and legal status to which every American is
entitled. It would prod the courts into taking long-overdue ac-
tion.184
The ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment is a beginning,
a symbol of the commitment of this nation to equality and freedom
for each and every individual. After all, that is what this country
is all about.
184. 116 CONG. REC. 35452 (1970) (remarks by Senator Bayh).
